Tax Elections & Private Bargaining (Part 1) Tax Elections & Private Bargaining (Part 1)

Tax Elections & Private Bargaining (Part 1‪)‬

Virginia Tax Review 2011, Summer, 31, 1

    • 2,99 €
    • 2,99 €

Beschreibung des Verlags

Focal points for private bargaining occur every instance the tax law provides a tax election that directly affects multiple taxpayers. These elections explicitly enable, and actually incentivize, the taxpayers to cooperate in order to reduce their aggregate tax burden. For example, divorced parents of a dependent child can negotiate about which parent will be entitled to take the dependency exemption for the child. If the parents work together, they can identify the parent for whom the dependency exemption will have the most value. By electing to allocate the dependency exemption to that parent, they can reduce their aggregate tax burden and share in the tax savings. Yet transaction costs, cognitive biases, and sheer irrationality can impede taxpayers' abilities to bargain effectively. Thus, in order to facilitate bargaining and reduce bargaining costs, this article analyzes how impediments to negotiation should affect the design of two key election parameters: (1) the allocation, among the affected taxpayers, of the power to make the election, and (2) the default rule that will apply if no election is made. As examples, this article examines tax bargaining focal points in three settings where the negotiating dynamic can differ significantly: divorce, employment, and corporate acquisitions. In addition to making a few specific proposals for modifying these elections, this article provides generalizable recommendations about how to design tax election parameters in order to facilitate effective and efficient bargaining. I. INTRODUCTION

GENRE
Business und Finanzen
ERSCHIENEN
2011
22. Juni
SPRACHE
EN
Englisch
UMFANG
35
Seiten
VERLAG
Virginia Tax Review
GRÖSSE
266,7
 kB

Mehr ähnliche Bücher

Tax Elections & Private Bargaining (Part 2) Tax Elections & Private Bargaining (Part 2)
2011
Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance (Virginia) Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance (Virginia)
2005
Taxes and Management: an Introduction Taxes and Management: an Introduction
2017
Risk, Return, And Objective Economic Substance. Risk, Return, And Objective Economic Substance.
2008
Advances in Taxation Advances in Taxation
2012
Endogenous Public Policy and Contests Endogenous Public Policy and Contests
2007

Mehr Bücher von Virginia Tax Review

The Digital VAT (D-VAT). (Value Added Tax) The Digital VAT (D-VAT). (Value Added Tax)
2006
Revisiting Global Formulary Apportionment. Revisiting Global Formulary Apportionment.
2010
Capital Income Taxation and Progressivity in a Global Economy. Capital Income Taxation and Progressivity in a Global Economy.
2010
Tax Information Reporting and Compliance in the Cross-Border Context. Tax Information Reporting and Compliance in the Cross-Border Context.
2007
Using the Social Background Model to Explain Who Wins Federal Appellate Tax Decisions: Do Less Traditional Judges Favor the Taxpayer? Using the Social Background Model to Explain Who Wins Federal Appellate Tax Decisions: Do Less Traditional Judges Favor the Taxpayer?
2005
A Malthusian Analysis of the Socalled Dynasty Trust. A Malthusian Analysis of the Socalled Dynasty Trust.
2009