Tax Elections & Private Bargaining (Part 2) Tax Elections & Private Bargaining (Part 2)

Tax Elections & Private Bargaining (Part 2‪)‬

Virginia Tax Review 2011, Summer, 31, 1

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Beschreibung des Verlags

IV. Designing the Election Parameters To Facilitate Tax Bargaining Given the possible welfare, distributional, and administrative consequences of the parameters of tax elections, policymakers should take care in the design of those parameters. The key parameters that set the stage for the private bargaining arc (1) the determination of which party or parties has the power to opt out of the default rule, and (2) the choice of default rule: (140)

GENRE
Business und Finanzen
ERSCHIENEN
2011
22. Juni
SPRACHE
EN
Englisch
UMFANG
103
Seiten
VERLAG
Virginia Tax Review
GRÖSSE
378,7
 kB

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