Hegel's Theory of Moral Action, Its Place in His System and the 'Highest' Right of the Subject (Georg Hegel‪)‬

1 INTRODUCTION There is at present, amongst Hegel scholars and in the interpretative discussions of Hegel's social and political theories, the flavour of old-style 'apology' for his liberal credentials, as though--prior to any attempt to engage with the social ethics he proposes--there exists a real need to prove Hegel holds basic liberal views palatable to the hegemonic, contemporary political worldview. (1) And this almost ubiquitous defensive attitude is present even in the face of a marked absence of convincing, contemporary avowals of the opposite, as though the default starting position is to assume that Hegel is a conservative or reactionary who distrusts the capacity of the modern subjective conscience to interrogate and legitimate social laws, conventions and institutions (that is, right in its broadest sense). (2) The putative motivation for such an understated presentation of Hegel's endorsement of subjective conscience within the limits and requirements of a rational state is perhaps due to two factors: one, the historical, yet false, understanding of Hegel as a conservative (3); and two, one of the methods for understanding Hegel's ethics is to reconstruct what is left of the modern moral conscience when the philosopher has finished discussing the flaws and contradictions of the Kantian model of moral judgement and motivation. (4) Although this is a fruitful and largely correct approach, it ignores the fact that Hegel's theory of action motivates the critique of transcendentalism rather than merely fills in the hole when one rejects Kantian ethics. (5)