Missile Defense Acquisition: Failure is Not an Option - MDA Exemption from Standard Acquisition Rules, More Deregulation for Preserving Agility in Equipping Warfighter with Ballistic Missile Defense

This report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. North Korea stunned the world in 1998 with the launch of a Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile over Japan into the sea. With the nation already possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the test launch signaled their intention to develop an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the Continental United States. In 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld made the decision to exempt MDA from the standard acquisition framework defined in the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) oversight process and DOD 5000.02 Acquisition Instruction. In light of the exemption, critics view MDA as possessing limited accountability, transparency, and incomplete engineering. However, the agency's exemption from the standard acquisition framework enables the rapid delivery of critical BMDS capabilities, increased acquisition process agility, and improved engineering rigor over time. With the MDA Director serving as the Milestone Decision Authority and Senior Procurement Executive, the agency's acquisition process is tailorable, flexible, and more responsive than the typical DOD acquisition process. MDA's internal functional managers provide expert assistance and timely reviews to sustain momentum in the acquisition process. With the introduction of MDA's Acquisition Management Instruction, the agency created a more efficient acquisition environment by removing unnecessary reviews, documentation, and reporting requirements as characterized in typical DOD acquisition programs. Simultaneous BMDS development and operations provides opportunities for early learning, essentially establishing a "self-correcting" acquisition approach with emphasis shifting from research and development to performance and manufacturing quality. This paper recommends continuing BMDS deregulation as it preserves MDA's agility and flexibility in rapidly equipping the Warfighter with improved BMDS capabilities.

This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

The rampant proliferation of threat ballistic missiles creates unique challenges for DOD and MDA BMDS acquisition efforts. Threat ballistic missile technologies proliferate and evolve at a faster rate than BMDS acquisition and fielding. Acquisition program managers pursue stable cost, schedule, and performance baselines to deliver capabilities to the Warfighter within budget, time constraints and meet or exceed specified requirements. As ballistic missile threats evolve, BMDS stakeholders must update system requirements in order to adjust to current threat capabilities. Retired Marine General James Mattis' renowned quote rings true, "The enemy gets a vote." Delivering a new BMDS capability too late is likely to lead to diminished mission relevance or in worst case, be completely ineffective against the new threat. The rapid proliferation and development of threat ballistic missile technologies underscores the importance of BMDS acquisition agility. MDA's BMDS acquisition strategy must be timely, flexible, and agile or risk irrelevance.